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Abstract
This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media mar-
kets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature
of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising op-
portunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a
competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing view-
ers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those
in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one
channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the
amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have
an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the
overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between
the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model
is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets.
We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on view-
ers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in
which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while
the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees.
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1 Introduction
Advertising expenditures for television commercials have grown sharply in
recent years in almost all industrialized countries. In Germany, expenditures
for television advertising amounted to 7.74 bn. euros in 2004, which in real
terms is three times higher than the expenditures in 1990.1 Similar numbers
can be found in almost all western countries. At the same time, there has
been an ongoing discussion if regulation concerning the amount and the
content of commercials is necessary.2 These days in the European Union,
there exists an advertising ceiling of 12 minutes per hour, although the media
commission of the European Union is discussing whether to abolish this law.
In contrast, an advertising cap in the United States was abolished already in
1981 by the Federal Communication Commission.3 So the question arises if
there is too much advertising in an unregulated broadcasting market, which
would render a regulation necessary, or if such a regulation is harmful.
In a recent paper, Anderson and Coate [2005] provide a careful analysis
of these issues. They model markets for media advertising as a two-sided
market with both positive and negative externalities: advertisers care posi-
tively about the number of viewers on the same platform, but viewers dislike
more advertising. Advertising is assumed to be informative. The paper pro-
vides useful insights in understanding strategic interaction in media markets
and the welfare properties of equilibrium under different market configura-
tions. It also inspired a rapidly growing literature (see a brief summary of
this below) that builds on the model of Anderson and Coate.
In this paper, we revisit the analysis of markets for media advertising
and point out that many of the results from the previous literature only
apply to settings in which viewers are not allowed to multi-home, i.e. to
connect to multiple platforms.4 What makes this observation particularly
1This accounted for 44% of all advertising expenditures (including ra-
dio, newspapers, and magazines, but not including Internet advertising) in
2004, while it accounted for only 25% of advertising expenditures in 1990
(http://www.agf.de/daten/werbemarkt/werbespendings/).
2See Motta & Polo (1997) for a history of regulation of TV advertising. For a recent
overview of the advantages and problems of advertising in the broadcasting industry, see
Armstrong and Weeds (2005).
3There is a ceiling on the amount of advertising during children’s programmes: 12
minutes per hour on weekdays and 10 minutes per hour during the weekend.
4Most of the time we will use the terminology “viewers” for ease of exposition, but the
model we present applies to various forms of broadcasting, where the precise terminology
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relevant is that in most media markets, restricting viewers to single-home is
not a realistic assumption: viewers can subscribe to multiple TV channels,
listeners can buy equipment to listen to many different radio stations, and
readers can subscribe to multiple magazines with similar content.5 We show
that adding this extra element of realism alters the nature of competition
in the market substantially, and it leads to different qualitative conclusions.
We also confront our model’s predictions with various stylized facts from
broadcasting markets and find that our model explains these facts better
than models with viewer single-homing.
In our model the sizes of exclusive and overlapping viewerships are en-
dogenously determined. A central feature, which distinguishes our model
from a standard Hotelling competition in which buyers can purchase mul-
tiple goods, is that overlapping viewers are less valuable for channels than
exclusive ones.6 There are two reasons for this. The first is a direct effect:
viewers subscribing to a second channel might substitute time away from
watching the first channel, which makes the first channel less attractive in
a setting of informative advertising (there is less chance of “hitting the tar-
get”). The second effect comes from the fact that the platforms provide
alternative ways of reaching a multi-homing viewer and therefore compete
with each other in selling advertising opportunities to these viewers. There-
fore, they can only obtain a competitive price for selling advertising oppor-
tunities to these viewers, which is equal to the incremental value of trying to
reach a viewer through a second channel. On the other hand, platforms are
monopolists with respect to selling advertising opportunities toward their
exclusive viewers, and they can extract all the surplus for this transaction
from advertisers. The reduced value of multi-homing viewers is the main
driving force behind our results. It induces platforms to distort their ad-
vertising decisions, in order to reduce or eliminate the overlap either on the
viewer side or on the advertiser side. Depending on which side it is less
costly to reduce overlap, advertising levels can be distorted both upward or
downward.
That multi-homing viewers are worth less to advertisers is consistent
with the empirically well-documented fact that the per-viewer fee of an ad-
would be “listeners” or “readers.”
5Of course, a viewer can only watch one programme at a time (and a listener only
listens to one radio station), but over the course of a week, or even just an evening,
viewers (listeners) typically switch among different channels.
6For a model that allows consumers to buy both products in a standard Hotelling
framework, see Kim and Serfes (2005).
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vertisement on programs with larger viewerships is larger. In the US, both
Fisher et. al. (1980) and Chwe (1998) find this regularity. In the UK, televi-
sion market ITV, the largest commercial network, enjoys a price premium on
its commercials.7 Our model is consistent with the regularity since reaching
the same number of eyeball pairs through broadcasting a commercial to a
large audience implies reaching more viewers than reaching the same num-
ber of eyeball pairs through a series of commercials to smaller audiences,
because the latter audiences might have some viewers in common.8
We characterize equilibrium advertising levels both for the case when
stations are owned by a monopolist and for the case of competing stations.
We show that in case of a price-discriminating monopolist (one who can
charge a different price to multi-homing advertisers than to single-homing
ones), equilibrium always entails too much advertising relative to the social
optimum. In all other cases, equilibrium can lead to either too much or too
little advertising from the social point of view. We also show that advertising
levels can be higher in duopoly competition than in case of a monopolist
provider. This is a different conclusion than what can be obtained from a
model with viewer single-homing, since in the latter the stations compete
for viewers by decreasing the level of advertising. Therefore our model, as
opposed to a model with viewer single-homing, can explain why competing
firms might support a regulation that establishes advertising caps.
Our model has different implications on how a station reacts to the en-
trance of a competing station as well. When platforms are weakly differenti-
ated in a single-homing model, entrance decreases the level of advertising on
a platform. This is because the incumbent firm is forced to make its channel
more appealing to viewers to avoid losing its marginal viewers. However, if
viewers can multi-home and the value of overlapping viewers is low, then
platforms increase advertising after the entry, to reduce the overlap in view-
ership. Moreover, in a model with viewer single-homing, it is never in the
interest of a station to ban advertising on a competing station, since that
7In fact, this premium increased steadily in the last decade, despite the entry of several
competitors and ITV’s decreasing market share (see the 2003 Competition Commission
Report). This is commonly referred to as the “ITV premium puzzle.” We thank Helen
Weeds for calling our attention to these facts.
8The fact that reaching the same potential buyer a second time is of less value than
reaching him the first time is already recognized by Ozga (1960): “... as more and more
of the potential buyers become informed of what is advertised, more and more of the
advertising effort is wasted, because a greater and greater proportion of people who see
the advertisements are already familiar with the object”(p. 40).
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only makes the other channel more attractive for viewers. On the other
hand, in our model this type of regulation is always in the interest of a sta-
tion who can advertise, since this way it becomes a monopolist to provide
advertising opportunities to all its viewers, even if there is overlap in viewer-
ships. This is in line with the fact that private channels in Germany (where
private and public channels have roughly equal viewerships) are putting up
resistance against a proposal that would lift advertising regulations on public
broadcasters.
We also point out that in a model with viewer multi-homing, platforms’
profits are not always monotonically increasing in the attractiveness of view-
ers. The intuition is that, if there is overlapping viewership, an increase in
the attractiveness also increases the overlap, which for a region of parameter
values dominates the positive effect of channels becoming more desirable for
viewers. This can explain why the price of commercials decreased signifi-
cantly in the last five years in the German broadcasting market, despite the
steady increase in the amount of time people spent watching TV, since an
increase in the desirability of channels presumably increased the overlap in
viewerships.
Finally, we show that if platforms are allowed to charge viewer fees,
then a certain type of asymmetric equilibrium arises. In this equilibrium,
one platform collects most or all of its revenues from advertising, while the
other platform collects most of its revenues via viewer fees and provides little
advertising. This type of differentiation can be observed in various settings,
such as the cable television market (“standard” cable channels and HBO
type channels).
There is an enormous and diverse literature on advertising. For a com-
prehensive summary, see Bagwell (2005). The informative view of adver-
tising that we take in this paper is formulated by Ozga (1960). The tradi-
tional literature on broadcasting assumes advertising revenues to be fixed
(e.g. Steiner (1952), Besen and Soligo (1973), Beebe (1977), and Spence and
Owen (1977)). Moreover, they do not model the externalities that adver-
tising is a nuisance to viewers and that more viewers are attractive for ad-
vertisers. There is also a large and growing literature on two-sided markets,
starting with Rochet and Tirole (2003).9 Below we only mention some re-
cent papers which are at the intersection of the above lines of research, since
they are the closest to our work. The recent literature on media markets
9For a survey of this literature, see Rochet and Tirole (2005).
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started with the aforementioned paper by Anderson and Coate (2005). We
use their model framework, with some modifications. Particularly related to
our investigation is section 7 of their paper, where they briefly investigate a
two-period model in which viewers can switch from one channel to the other
after period 1. It is shown that in this case, the possibility of underadver-
tising is mitigated. Choi (2004) uses the Anderson and Coate framework
to investigate how regulating the number of stations or the amount of ad-
vertising affects welfare. Crampes et al. (2005) compare price competition
and quantity competition in media markets. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and
Peitz and Valletti (2004) extend the analysis by examining location choices
of stations. Finally, Armstrong (2005), using a two-sided market model
with no negative externalities, investigates whether stations prefer charging
advertisers on a per-consumer basis or on a lump-sum basis. For a recent
empirical work on estimating advertising demand and advertising surplus in
the US radio broadcasting industry, see Berry and Waldfogel (1999).
2 The Model
We use a simplified version of the model in Anderson and Coate (2005),
in that we assume homogeneous advertisers, but extend the model with
the possibility of multi-homing on the viewer side. The model features a
two-stage game with three different types of players: platforms owner(s),
viewers, and advertisers.
Platforms
There are two platforms (channels), indexed by i ∈ {0, 1}. We will inves-
tigate both the case in which the same owner operates both platforms, and
the case in which the channels are competing. The owners of platforms set
the advertising levels a0 and a1, with the aim of maximizing profits.10 In the
monopoly case, we also investigate the possibility that the monopolist can
sell joint advertising slots for the two platforms. In this case, the monopolist
sets three quantities: a0, a1, and a01, where a0 and a1 are the quantities of
single advertising slots on the either of the platforms, while a01 is the quan-
tity of joint advertising slots. The resulting total amount of advertising on
10Alternatively, we could consider a model in which platforms set prices. This leads to
conclusions similar to those in the quantity competition we investigate, but the analysis
(in particular, characterizing the range of parameter values resulting in different types of
equilibria) is technically more difficult.
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the channels is then a0 = a0 + a01 and a1 = a1 + a01. We refer to the latter
case as a price-discriminating monopolist (since the equilibrium price of a
joint advertising slot will typically be different from the sum of the prices
of single advertising slots), while we refer to the case when a monopolist
can only set two quantities as a nondiscriminating monopolist. The profit
function of the nondiscriminating monopolist is ΠND = a0p0 + a1p1, with
pi being the market clearing price of an advertising slot on platform i. The
profit function of platform i in duopoly is Πi = aipi, and the profit of the
discriminating monopolist is Πdis = a0p0+ a1p1+ a01p01. This specification
assumes that platforms collect all their revenues from advertisers. In Section
5, we consider the case when platforms can also charge subscription fees on
viewers.
Viewers
There is a continuum of viewers with mass M , uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Viewers can decide to watch both channels, meaning that they can
subscribe to both channels and split their time between watching the two
programs.11 A viewer who is located at position xj obtains a net viewing
benefit of β− γa0− τxj if only watching channel 0, and β− γa1− τ(1− xj)
if only watching channel 1. Viewers have heterogeneous tastes, with those
located at point 0 liking channel 0 most and those located at point 1 liking
channel 1 most. The marginal travel cost is τ . β represents the base level of
utility from watching one’s ideal channel. Finally, viewers dislike advertising
and γ represents the nuisance cost parameter concerning commercials. As
in Anderson and Coate (2005), viewers do not get any positive value from
advertising, because advertisers are monopolist producers of differentiated
products and therefore can extract all consumer surplus (see below in more
detail).
A viewer who watches both channels obtains utility u(β−γa0− τxj , β−
γa1 − τ(1 − xj)). We assume that u is increasing in both variables, and
that u(β − γa0 − τxj , 0) = β − γa0 − τxj and u(0, β − γa1 − τ(1 − xj)) =
β − γa1 − τ(1− xj). The above specification implies that a viewer watches
channel 0 iff β−γa0−τxj > 0, and watches channel 1 iff β−γa1−τ(1−xj) >
11If the media platforms are radio or TV stations, then multi-homing implies that the
listener/viewer subscribes to both channels (or has equipment to tune into both stations)
and over a unit interval of time, which can be a day or a week, spends a positive amount
of time listening to/watching each channel. If the media platforms are magazines with
similar content, multi-homing implies that the reader reads both magazines.
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0 (in particular, if both of the above terms are positive, then the viewer
watches both channels).
Advertisers
There is a continuum of advertisers with mass N . To simplify the anal-
ysis, we restrict attention to the case when advertisers are homogeneous. In
Section 6, we briefly discuss how our results extend to the case of heteroge-
neous advertisers.
Advertising is informative. Each advertiser is a monopolist producer of
a differentiated product, with constant marginal cost of zero. Consumers
have to get informed of the product through advertising in order to be able
to buy it. For each product, a fraction q of the viewers (randomly selected)
has a reservation value normalized to A, while the rest of the viewers have
reservation value 0. Because the advertiser is a monopolist producer of its
product, it charges a price of exactly A.
The gross value of an advertising slot on a platform for an advertiser is
equal to the expected increase in sales revenues that the commercial gener-
ates, which depends on the number of viewers who watch this channel, the
time they spend watching it, and whether the same viewers can get informed
about the product by watching the other channel. The amount of time a
viewer spends watching a channel over a unit interval of time is t ∈ [0, 1].
There is ε ∈ [0, 1] probability that a viewer does not pay attention to a
commercial when it appears on the screen. Commercials appear at random
times on the channel, and so the expected value of advertising to a consumer
is t(1−ε)qA. If the same viewer watches two channels, and spends t amount
of time watching each channel, then advertising to this viewer through both
channels yields an expected value [t(1−ε)+ t(1−ε)(tε)]qA. In what follows
we simplify the model by assuming that each viewer who only watches one
channel spends the same amount of time t′ on watching the channel. Simi-
larly, each viewer who watches both channel spends the same amount of time
t′′ on watching each channel.12 Furthermore, we assume that t′′ ∈ [t′/2, t′].
In the limit case t′′ = t′, a viewer does not substitute any time away from
the first channel when subscribing to a second channel.
12More general formulations, in which the amount of time a viewer spends on watching
a channel depends on the utility the viewer obtains from connecting to the channel, would
imply the same qualitative conclusions.
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This formulation leads to a reduced form in which the expected value of
advertising to a viewer who watches exactly one channel is ω, the expected
value of advertising through exactly one channel to a viewer who watches
two channels is ω′ ∈ [ω/2, ω], and the expected value of advertising through
both channels to a viewer who watches two channels is ω′+ω′′, where ω′′ ∈
(0, ω′).13 The incremental value of reaching the viewer with a commercial
through a second channel (ω′′) is smaller than the value of reaching her
through the first channel (ω′) because there is a chance that the viewer
already got informed about the product through the first channel.14
Let n0 denote viewers who watch channel 0 (including those who also
watch channel 1), n1 denote viewers who only watch channel 1 (including
those who also watch channel 0), and n01 denote viewers who watch both
channels. Then the profit of an advertiser is:
pi =

0 if he does not advertise
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ − pi if he advertises only on platform i
(n0 + n1 − 2n01)ω + n01(ω′ + ω′′)− p0 − p1 if he advertises on both.
We note that the above payoff structure need not apply to types of
advertising other than informative. For example, in case of persuasive ad-
vertising, it is not clear if the value of reaching a given viewer the second
or third time is less valuable for an advertiser than the first time. However,
even in this case, there is a reason why overlapping viewers can be less valu-
able than exclusive ones, namely that it is easier to reach viewers the ideal
number of times if they only watch one station (in the case of overlapping
viewerships, an advertiser can only reach all viewers the desired number of
times if some people are reached inefficiently many times). Moreover, the
empirical findings in media markets from the US and UK are consistent with
the assumption that overlapping viewers are less valuable for advertisers. In
the UK, the ITV network (commonly known as “Channel 3”) is the biggest
commercial television network. Because of entry of many new smaller chan-
nels (like “Channel 4” in 1983 or “Channel 5” in 1997), the audience share of
ITV decreased steadily over the last 15 years.15 Yet the percentage of ITV’s
13In particular, ω = t′(1− ε)qA, ω′ = t′′(1− ε)qA, and ω′′ = [t′′(1− ε)(t′′ε)]qA.
14The same applies when the same advertiser buys a second advertising slot on the same
platform. The latter phenomenon does not arise in equilibrium in our model if there are
enough potential advertisers (which we assume below).
15The audience share in 1987 was 40 percent, while in 2003 it was only 22.2 percent.
See Competition Commission (2003), p. 96.
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net advertising revenue out of total TV advertising revenue has decreased
by far less. Moreover, from 1992 on, the advertising price (per adult impact)
of ITV has increased.16 This increase was even higher from 1997 to 2002, a
time during which many new competing channels entered the market. This
phenomenon is known as the “ITV premium puzzle.” A possible explanation
for the puzzle, which is mentioned in a 2003 Competition Commission Re-
port, is that if a commercial reaches one million pair of eyeballs on ITV, it is
likely to reach a million different people, since ITV has many mass audience
programmes.17 On the other hand, reaching a million pairs of eyes on other
channels means reaching much less than a million viewers, because there are
many viewers whom the commercial reaches multiple times. The fact that
the price per viewer of a commercial is increasing in audience size is a strong
pattern in US data as well: see for example Fisher et al. (1980) and Chwe
(1998). In fact, Fisher et al. (1980) provides a reasoning similar to our
main argument: “a spot on a large audience provides a greater number of
different viewers than two spots on a smaller audience, because the smaller
audience may have some viewers in common,” and so advertisers are willing
to pay more for it than for the two spots together.
Timing of the game
First, platform owners simultaneously set advertising levels (number of
advertisement slots) on their platforms, that is, a0, a1, and a01 in the case
of a discriminating monopolist, and a0 and a1 in the other cases. The
chosen advertising levels determine the prices that clear the market. In the
next section, we show that these market clearing prices are unique. Finally,
viewers observe the levels of advertising on the platforms and decide whether
to watch both channels, only one, or neither of them.
3 Equilibrium Levels of Advertising
In this section, we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game
introduced in the previous section, both for when the platforms are owned
16The advertising price is measured as the expenditure of an advertiser divided by the
impact on its targeting group, where the latter is measured as percentage of viewers of the
targeted group. This variable does not account for double viewing, so if a viewer watches
the commercial twice, she is counted in the same way as two viewers who have seen the
commercial once.
17See Competition Commission (2003), p. 123 and p. 136.
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u0 u1
6 6 10 ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n0−n01=1−β−γa1τ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1−n01=1−β−γa0τ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n01=
2β−γ(a0+a1)
τ
−1
xm0 = β−γa0τ1− β−γa1τ = xm1
Figure 1: Viewerships (if viewers overlap)
by a monopolist provider and for the case of competing platforms. For the
characterization of the equilibrium of the corresponding model when viewers
are not allowed to multi-home (which is essentially the model in Anderson
and Coate (2005) restricted to a setting with homogeneous advertisers), see
Appendix A.
3.1 General considerations
First, note that the amount of viewers is determined uniquely by the ad-
vertising quantity decisions of channels. In the nondiscriminating monopoly
case and the duopoly case, it is given by n0 = max(0,min(β−γa0τ , 1)M)
for platform 0, and n1 = max(0,min(β−γa1τ , 1)M) for platform 1. The
marginal viewers in an inner solution are xm0 = β−γa0τ and xm1 = 1− β−γa1τ .
The overlapping viewership is n01 = max(0, xm0 − xm1)M , which is equal
to max(0, 2β−γ(a0+a1)τ − 1)M for an inner solution. In the discriminating
monopoly case, the viewerships are n0 = max(0,min(
β−γ(a0+a01)
τ , 1)M) and
n1 = max(0,min(
β−γ(a0+a01)
τ , 1)M) for platforms 0 and 1, respectively. The
marginal viewers and the viewerships are displayed in Figure 1.
Next, it can be shown (see Lemmas 1 and 2 in Appendix B) that for
almost all advertising level choices the market clearing prices are uniquely
determined, and given by:
pi =

ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 ≤ N
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 > N.
for ad-
vertising slots on platform i in the nondiscriminating monopoly and in the
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duopoly case. In the discriminating monopoly case, they are given by
pi =
{
ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ if n0 + n1 > M for an advertising slot on
platform i and by p01 = ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01 for the joint
advertising slots. Moreover, market clearing prices can be assumed without
loss of generality to be given by the above formulas for all pairs of advertising
levels in equilibrium.18
Equilibrium prices depend on the number of overlapping and nonover-
lapping viewers, and on whether advertisers overlap or not.
For ease of exposition, we impose the following two-parameter restriction
for the subsequent analysis:
max(
β
2γ
,
2β − τ
2γ
) ≤ N (1)
β − γN
2
≤ τ. (2)
The first one rules out boundary cases in which all potential advertisers
advertise on a platform. The second one implies that the nuisance parame-
ter is high enough such that if the amount of advertising is at least N2 (half
of the potential advertisers are present), then not every viewer would watch
both channels. This assumption rules out boundary cases in which even for
relatively high levels of advertising, all viewers watch both channels in equi-
librium. The above restrictions are only made for analytical convenience,
in order to avoid checking whether the corresponding boundary conditions
a0, a1 ≤ N and x0 ≤ 1, x1 ≥ 0 bind. Dropping these restrictions does not
change the qualitative features of the analysis.
3.2 Monopoly
A provider who owns both stations can choose to set advertising levels such
that in the resulting continuation equilibrium: (i) there is no overlap either
on the viewer side or the advertiser side; (ii) viewers overlap but advertisers
18For certain advertising level choices there are multiple market clearing prices. For
example if ai = N then any price below what is specified above clears the market, too.
The reason this does not matter in equilibrium is that a channel can always choose an
advertising level arbitrarily close to the original level, such that the market clearing prices
are now uniquely determined and they are given by the formulas above.
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do not; (iii) advertisers overlap but viewers do not; and (iv) there is overlap
on both sides. Which of the above is optimal depends on the parameters
of the model, in particular on the relative scarcity of advertisers, the nui-
sance parameter, and the travel cost. For a formal derivation of equilibrium
advertising levels for different parameter values, see Appendix B. Here we
only state the results and provide intuition for the optimal strategy of the
monopolist.
Proposition 1: Assume that the platforms are owned by a nondis-
criminating monopolist. Then advertising levels chosen in equilibrium are
generically unique, and depending on the parameters they can take the fol-
lowing values:
(a) a0 = a1 = β2γ (viewerships do not overlap)
(b) a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ (exactly half of the viewers watch each channel)
(c) a0 = a1 = max(
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′−ω) ,
β−τ
γ ) (overlap of viewers, but not of
advertisers)
(d) a0 = a1 = N/2 (exactly half of the potential advertisers advertise on
each channel)
(e) a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′′−ω) (overlap on both sides).
In region (a), the travel cost parameter is so high (τ > β) that viewer-
ships in equilibrium do not overlap: n0 = n1 < M2 and n01 = 0. The owner
can set the optimal level of advertising on the platforms independently of
each other, since advertising revenues are not interrelated.
In regions (b)-(e), the travel cost parameter is low enough so that the
monopolist cannot set the levels of advertising that would be optimal for
isolated platforms without establishing an overlap in the viewerships.
In region (b), ω′ is low enough such that establishing an overlapping
viewership is not profitable. In this case, the monopolist chooses advertising
levels such that exactly half of the viewers watch each channel: n0 = n1 = M2
and n01 = 0.
In region (c), there is a relative abundance of potential advertisers, and
ω′ is high. In this case, viewerships overlap, but advertisers do not: n01 > 0
and a0 = a1 < N2 .
In region (d), there is a relative scarcity of advertisers, and ω′′ is low.
In this case, the monopolist sets advertising levels such that exactly half of
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the potential advertisers advertise on each platform, but there is overlap in
viewerships: a0 = a1 = N2 and n01 > 0.
In region (e), there is a relative scarcity of advertisers, and ω′′ is high. In
this case, the monopolist sets advertising levels such that both advertisers
and viewers overlap: a0 = a1 > N2 and n01 > 0.
We note that if the number of potential advertisers is high enough,
such that 2β−τγ ≤ N, then the equilibrium advertising levels cannot be the
quantities in (d) or (e), since overlapping viewership in this region implies
a0 + a1 < N . Therefore, if there is no scarcity of potential advertisers and
the travel cost parameter is low enough, the monopolist’s problem is simpli-
fied to choosing between establishing overlapping viewership or establishing
viewerships that just do not overlap.
Next we consider the case when the monopolist can offer a price discount
to advertisers who advertise on both platforms. The difference compared to
the nondiscrimination case is that now the monopolist can extract the whole
surplus ω′ + ω′′, as opposed to 2ω′′, from advertising a product to a multi-
homing viewer through both channels. This makes two-sided multi-homing a
more desirable choice for the monopolist. Note that the value of advertising
two different products on the two different channels to a multi-homing viewer
is 2ω′, which still exceeds ω′ + ω′′.
Since the value of nonoverlapping viewers and the value of overlapping
viewers in case of nonoverlapping advertisers are not affected by whether
the monopolist can price discriminate or not, outside the region of two-
sided overlapping potential equilibrium advertising levels are the same as in
the nondiscriminating monopoly case.
Proposition 2: Assume that the platforms are owned by a nondis-
criminating monopolist. Then advertising levels chosen in equilibrium are
generically unique. If there is two-sided overlap in equilibrium, then they
are given by a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
2(2ω′′−ω)γ . Otherwise the possible
equilibrium levels of advertising are as in Proposition 1.
Because of the increased value of overlapping viewers in the case of two-
sided overlapping, the parameter region in which the monopolist chooses
two-sided overlap is strictly larger than in case of a nondiscriminating mo-
nopolist. Conversely, the regions in which the monopolist chooses either
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just nonoverlapping viewerships (a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ ) or just nonoverlapping
advertisers (a0 = a1 = N2 ) are smaller.
3.3 Duopoly
Here we analyze the case when the stations are controlled by different firms.
If τ ≥ β, then advertising levels in equilibrium are the same as in the case of
monopoly ownership, because viewerships do not overlap and the stations
can act as local monopolists. From now on, we assume β > τ .
The next proposition characterizes possible symmetric equilibrium ad-
vertising levels in the duopoly game, for different parameter values.
Proposition 3: Assume that the platforms are owned by competing
providers and that β > τ . Then the following levels of advertising can
constitute symmetric equilibria:
(a) a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ
(b) a0 = a1 = max(
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) ,
β−τ
γ )
(c) a0 = a1 = N2
(d) a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) .
The duopoly game has exactly the same types of symmetric equilibria as
the monopoly game. Advertising levels in equilibrium are such that viewers
do not overlap (including the case when exactly half of them connect to
each channel), or viewers overlap but advertisers do not (including the case
when exactly half of them advertise on each channel), or there is two-sided
overlap. Moreover, the conditions for the existence of these different types
of equilibria are similar to the conditions that determine which type of equi-
librium prevails in the monopoly case. However, both the boundaries of the
regions and the equilibrium advertising levels within a region differ from the
monopoly case. This is because the duopolist providers do not take into
account the effects of their advertising decisions on the profits generated on
the other platform. In particular, if the level of advertising decreases on
a platform, then the number of multi-homing viewers can increase, which
affects the amount of revenues the other platform can collect for providing
advertising opportunities after their viewers.
In contrast with the monopoly case, it is not true that equilibrium adver-
tising levels are generically unique, even if one restricts attention to symmet-
ric equilibria. It can be shown that there is a nonempty range of parameter
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values such that both a0 = a1 = N2 and a0 = a1 =
2β−τ
2γ are equilibria.
In this region, the value of overlapping viewers is low in case of two-sided
overlapping, so firms set advertising levels to avoid two-sided multi-homing.
They can achieve this either by setting advertising levels high and avoiding
overlapping of viewers, or by setting advertising levels low and avoiding over-
lapping of advertisers. The reason for this multiplicity is that advertising
levels are strategic complements: the optimal level of advertising of a station
increases in the level of advertising chosen by the other station. In a similar
vein, there is a range of parameter values such that both a0 = a1 = N2 and
a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) can be an equilibrium.
Besides the above symmetric equilibria, the duopoly game can have
asymmetric equilibria as well, in two cases. One is when the stations set
advertising levels such that viewers just do not overlap. Then besides the
equilibrium in which exactly half of the viewers watch each channel, there
are equilibria in which stations share the market asymmetrically. Similarly,
when stations set advertising levels such that advertisers just do not overlap,
there are equilibria in which stations divide advertisers unequally. We do
not provide a formal characterization of these asymmetric equilibria here.
In general, the above equilibria cannot be “too asymmetric”; otherwise the
firm with the smaller market share would have an incentive to deviate and
establish two-sided multi-homing. Furthermore, the lower the value of over-
lapping viewers for the stations is, the more asymmetric equilibria can exist.
We note that in these asymmetric equilibria, the aggregate profit of the firms
is strictly smaller than in the symmetric equilibrium.
4 Comparative investigation of advertising levels
In this section, we derive some qualitative conclusions of the model in which
there can be multi-homing on both sides, and compare the predictions with
those that can be obtained from a model in which the viewers are not al-
lowed to multi-home. We also relate our findings to some stylized facts from
television advertising markets in the US and Germany.
4.1 Ownership structure and advertising levels
We start out by comparing equilibrium advertising levels under monopoly
ownership and duopoly competition and show that in our model, as opposed
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to a model with viewer single-homing, competing stations might have an
incentive to support a regulation establishing advertising ceilings.
In the benchmark model where viewers can only single-home, a mo-
nopolist platform provider always chooses levels of advertising (weakly)
higher than the equilibrium levels in duopoly competition. In particular,
if τ ≥ 2/3β, then monopoly and duopoly imply the same levels of advertis-
ing, while τ < 2/3β implies that the amount of advertising is strictly smaller
in duopoly than in monopoly.19
This result no longer holds in the model with viewer multi-homing. Ad-
vertising level in a duopoly equilibrium can be both larger or smaller than
the advertising levels set by either a nondiscriminating or a discriminating
monopolist. This is despite the fact that competing platform owners, as op-
posed to a monopolist provider, do not take into account the positive effect
of increasing their level of advertising on revenues obtained on the other
platform, which is a force driving advertising levels downward. This effect
can be offset for several different reasons. First, in the discriminating mo-
nopolist case, the platform owner can extract higher revenues of overlapping
viewers in case of two-sided overlapping. Therefore, there is a region of pa-
rameter values such that the unique symmetric duopoly equilibrium involves
high enough advertising levels such that viewerships do not overlap, while
the discriminating monopolist chooses lower levels of advertising that induce
two-sided multi-homing. Second, if there are multiple symmetric equilibria
in duopoly competition, then one of these equilibria might imply higher lev-
els of advertising than the levels chosen by either the discriminating or a
nondiscriminating monopolist. For example, there is a nonempty intersec-
tion of region (d) in Proposition 1 and region (a) in Proposition 3. For these
parameter values a nondiscriminating monopolist chooses advertising levels
N
2 (advertisers just do not overlap), while there is a symmetric equilibrium
in duopoly such that a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ >
N
2 (viewers just do not overlap).
The above result is consistent with the empirical finding in Brown and
Alexander (2004) that a decrease in concentration in the broadcasting indus-
try leads to a lower amount of commercial time and to increased viewerships.
The result also implies that, as opposed to a model in which viewers can
only single-home, competing firms in the multi-homing model might find it
profitable to establish advertising ceilings (since profits are always higher in
19See Appendix A.
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the monopoly cases). This can be an explanation of why stations in the US
voluntarily established such a ceiling in the 1970s. The National Association
of Broadcasters (NAB) had a code of conduct in place which limited the ad-
vertising time per hour to 9.5 minutes in primetime and to 16.5 minutes at
all other times.20 There are several other possible explanations, the most
natural one being that the code of conduct was a standard cartel agreement,
to keep prices of commercials high. Indeed, the Department of Justice al-
leged that the Code of Conduct and kept the price of advertising high and
therefore violated antitrust laws. As a consequence, the NAB voluntarily
quit the Code in 1983. However, this story is still difficult to reconcile with
a model with viewer single-homing, unless either advertisers are credit con-
strained or their production technologies inhibit decreasing returns to scale.
Otherwise, since viewerships are distinct in the latter model, and therefore
the stations sell different “goods” to advertisers, a smaller supply of ad-
vertising spots on other stations does not increase demand for a station’s
advertising spots. Hence, stations would not have an incentive to form a
cartel.
4.2 Social welfare
In Appendix A, we show that in a model in which viewers can only single-
home and the channels collect their revenues from advertising fees, a mo-
nopolist provider always chooses a (weakly) higher level of advertising than
what is socially optimal. The intuition is that the monopolist does not fully
internalize the negative externality of advertising on viewers. On the other
hand, whether duopoly competition induces too much or too little advertis-
ing relative to the socially optimal level depends on the magnitudes of the
nuisance cost parameter and the traveling cost parameter. If both of these
parameters are small enough, then competition implies too little advertising.
Below we show that in our model, the result that a monopolist always
chooses too high levels of advertising only holds for the case of the discrim-
inating monopolist.
Social welfare in our model is the sum of aggregate viewer surplus and
the total surplus from advertising, which can be written as follows:
WF = a0
(
ω(n0 − n01) + ω′n01
)
+
20For further reference, see Campbell (1999).
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a1
(
ω(n1 − n01) + ω′n01
)
+
a01[ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01]+
M
(n0−n01)/M∫
0
(β − γa0 − τx)dx+M
1∫
1−(n1−n01)/M
(β − γa1 − τ(1− x))dx)+
n0/M∫
(n0−n01)/M
u(β − γa0 − τx, β − γa1 − τ(1− x))dx,
where ai = ai + a01 for i = {0, 1}.
Note that the sum of the first three terms is exactly equal to the profit
function of a discriminating monopolist, and that the last three terms are
decreasing in advertising levels. This can be used to establish the following
result.
Proposition 4: A discriminating monopolist always chooses a higher
advertising level than what is socially optimal.
A similar general result cannot be established for the nondiscriminating
monopolist and the duopoly case. The intuition is that if stations cannot
price discriminate, then they cannot extract the full surplus from advertis-
ing toward overlapping viewers. The result is that, for a range of parameter
values, the welfare maximizing outcome implies two-sided overlapping (i.e.,
advertising levels higher than N2 ), while the monopolist sets advertising lev-
els equal to N2 to avoid overlapping of advertisers.
One can derive further welfare implications by choosing a concrete model
specification. Below we consider the case when ω′ = ω, that is, when viewers
do not substitute time away from viewing a channel if they start watching
a second channel. In this case, there is a natural specification of the utility
function of a multi-homing viewer located at xi, given by:
Uj = s0(β − γa0 − τxj) + s1(β − γa1 − τ(1− xj)),
where si, i ∈ {0, 1} denotes an indicator function that is 1 if β−γa0−τxj >
0 (resp. β − γa1 − τ(1 − xj) > 0) and 0 if β − γa0 − τxj ≤ 0 (resp.
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β − γa1 − τ(1 − xj) ≤ 0).That is, utility of a viewer is just the sum of
utilities obtained from watching the channels.
Characterizing the welfare maximizing solution is a similar exercise to
characterizing equilibrium levels for a discriminating monopolist; therefore
here we only report the possible equilibrium levels of advertising.
The welfare maximizing levels of advertising in the above specification
can take the following values:
(a) aWFi = 0
(b) aWFi =
β(ω−γ)
(2ω−γ)γ
(c) aWFi =
N
2
(d) aWFi =
β(ω−γ)−Nγ(ω−ω′′)
γ(4ω′′−2ω−γ)
(e) aWFi =
2β−τ
2γ .
Region (a) corresponds to the case when the nuisance parameter is high
(ω < γ). In all other regions welfare maximizing advertising levels are
similar to the types of equilibrium outcomes characterized in Section 3.
In this model specification, if we restrict attention to the region in which
there is two-sided overlapping in equilibrium, then we can obtain a clear-cut
ordering of equilibrium advertising levels relative to the welfare maximizing
levels. Let aWF denote the welfare maximizing level of advertising on a sta-
tion, and let adis, and, and aduo denote the equilibrium levels of advertising
in the discriminating monopoly, nondiscriminating monopoly, and duopoly
cases, respectively.
Proposition 5: If ω′ = ω and there is overlap on both sides in equilib-
rium, then advertising levels are too high in all three regimes compared to
the socially optimal level. The order of advertising levels is aWF < adis <
aduo < and.
Relationship aWF < adis is implied by Proposition 4. aduo < and always
holds within the region where equilibrium implies two-sided overlapping,
because the duopolist stations do not take into account the negative exter-
nality of decreasing their levels of advertising on the profits of the other
station. Finally, adis < aduo holds if ω′ = ω because in this specification,
a discriminating monopolist values overlapping viewers in case of two-sided
overlapping relatively high compared to duopolist firms, and therefore ad-
vertises less to increase the overlap.
20
4.3 Entrance of a competitor and advertising
In this subsection, we investigate how a channel adjusts the level of advertis-
ing after the entrance of a competing channel, in the two-sided multi-homing
model introduced in Section 2, and in a corresponding model in which view-
ers can only single-home.
If only firm 0 is present in the market, it is straightforward to establish
that in equilibrium it chooses a0 = max( β2γ ,
β−τ
γ ).
Assume now that firm 1 enters the market. If viewers can only single-
home, the equilibrium levels of advertising are given by:21
a0 = a1 =

β
2γ if β ≤ τ
2β−τ
2γ if β > τ ≥ (2β)/3
τ
γ if τ < (2β)/3.
This implies that in the single-homing case, whether the entrance of a
competitor increases the level of advertising depends on the traveling cost
parameter. If τ > β2 , then the amount of advertising on channel 0 increases
(weakly). If differentiation between channels is high, then stealing marginal
consumers from the competitor is costly. Then in equilibrium, channels
advertise a lot, to a smaller audience. However, if τ < β2 , then entrance
decreases the amount of advertising on channel 0. If channels are less differ-
entiated, then competition for viewers forces the channels to advertise less,
to retain marginal consumers switching to the competitor.
If consumers can multi-home, then it can be shown that as long as the
number of potential advertisers is high enough, entrance of a competitor
increases the level of advertising on a station.
Proposition 6: If N ≥ 2β−τγ , then entrance of a competitor always
weakly increases the level of advertising on a station.
IfN < 2β−τγ then entrance of a competitor can either decrease or increase
the level of advertising, depending on the type of equilibrium that prevails
for the specific parameter values.
The above implies that for some parameter regions, the difference be-
tween predictions of the single-homing and multi-homing models is stark.
21See Appendix A.
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For example, this is the case when the travel cost parameter is low (the
stations are weakly differentiated) and the amount of potential advertis-
ers is large. In these cases, competition for viewers in the single-homing
model forces a channel to decrease the level of advertising, while in the
multi-homing model, competition increases the level of advertising on the
channel, because of the decreased value of overlapping viewers.
The entry of a competitor, as expected, decreases the equilibrium of
profit of a firm both in the model with viewer single-homing and in the model
with viewer multi-homing. However, there is a sharp difference between
the predictions of the two models in how a station’s profit is affected by
a competing channel switching from no advertising to advertising. The
investigation of this question is motivated by an ongoing policy debate in
Germany concerning regulating the level of advertising on public stations.
The German broadcasting market consists of six major channels (ARD,
Pro7, RTL, SAT1, ZDF, and the “third programmes,” which are regional
programmes in each state). Each of these channels has a market share be-
tween 10% and 14%, leading with ARD with 13.9% and ending with SAT1
with 10.3%.22 Three of the channels are public channels (ARD, ZDF, and
the “third programmes”) and are financed partly by taxes and partly by
advertising revenues. The other three channels (Pro7, RTL, SAT1) are pri-
vate stations and collect revenues only through advertising. For the private
stations, there is no law regulating their broadcasting of commercials be-
sides the 12 minutes per hour limit set by the media commission of the
European Union. The public stations, on the other hand, are not allowed
to broadcast commercials after 8:00 p.m. The German government is cur-
rently discussing whether to abolish this law and to allow public stations to
broadcast advertising after 8:00 p.m. It is well-publicized that the private
stations strongly oppose this abolishment, arguing that the public stations
have a social mission for their viewers and should therefore not be allowed
to fill their viewing time with commercials.23
This stylized fact would be difficult to reconcile with models in which
advertisers can multi-home but viewers can only single-home. If viewers can
only single-home, then channels sell advertising opportunities toward dis-
tinct viewerships. Hence, as long as advertisers are not budget constrained,
22The source of these data is AGF/GfK Fernsehforschung. See also www.agf.de.
23For example, in July 2005, the president of the Association of Private Radio and
Telecommunication demanded a complete advertising ban for public TV stations. See e.g.
www.presseportal.de.
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and their production technologies do not inhibit decreasing returns to scale,
an increased supply of advertising slots by competing channels does not de-
crease the demand for advertising on a station. Therefore, the only effect of
increased advertising on a competing station is through its impact on view-
erships. And in the viewer single-homing model, more advertising on a rival
station makes that station less attractive; therefore it increases the number
of viewers on its own station and leads to higher profits. This implies that
private stations should be supporting an initiative like that above. However,
their behavior is in line with the results of our model. If viewers multi-home
(and indeed there is a large overlapping viewership between public and pri-
vate channels), then allowing a competing station to advertise decreases a
station’s profit, because it can only extract ω′′ after selling advertising op-
portunities toward an overlapping viewer, while previously it could extract
ω′.24
4.4 Comparative statics
In case of a monopolist provider, advertising levels and firms’ profits are
monotonic in the parameters of the model, with the expected signs. An in-
crease in β or a decrease in either γ or τ increases advertising levels and prof-
its, because the same viewership sizes are compatible with higher amounts of
advertising. Similarly, increases in ω, ω′, and ω′′ increase advertising levels
and profits.
In case of competing channels, these relationships can become nonmono-
tonic. In particular, firms’ profits can be nonmonotonic in τ .
Proposition 7: There is a range of parameter values for which advertis-
ing levels are uniquely determined in duopoly competition, and equilibrium
profits of the stations are strictly decreasing in τ .
An increase in τ on one hand has a direct negative effect on profits of
the firms, because it reduces the total potential surplus (stations become
less valuable for viewers). However, it decreases the amount of overlap in
viewerships, which has a positive effect on firms’ profits. For a range of
24Another, complementary explanation for this behavior is that public stations could
obtain higher revenues, which if used to improve the quality of programs, could induce
some viewers to substitute time away from watching private channels to watching public
channels.
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parameter values, the second effect dominates, implying that a decrease in
the appeal of stations increases their profits.
This result can provide an explanation for a surprising recent devel-
opment in the German broadcasting market: viewership in the last five
years has grown steadily, but this was accompanied by decreasing advertis-
ing prices. The percentage of viewers in the population on a regular weekday
has increased from 73.7% to 75.4% from 2001 to 2004, and the average min-
utes per day a viewer spends watching TV have increased from 192 to 210.
But during this time, commercial prices have decreased by roughly 10%.
The price per 1000 pairs of eyeballs of a 30-second commercial has dropped
from 10.34 to 9.52 euros. Furthermore, television advertising expenditures
increased from 7.636 bn to 7.744 bn euros, which together with the decreas-
ing prices indicates that at the same time the level of advertising increased.25
Our model provides an explanation to this seemingly puzzling observation.
During this time period, it is notable that the content of public stations
has moved closer to the one of private stations, especially in the afternoon
and late-afternoon programme. This move was made to attract more view-
ers, in particular younger ones who are a particularly attractive consumer
group for advertisers. In our model, this development can be associated
with a decrease in τ , which makes the channels more attractive and induces
more potential viewers to watch. But this also increases the overlapping
viewership among channels and therefore lowers advertising prices.26
5 Introducing viewer fees
In this section, we analyze the case when stations, in addition to collecting
revenues from advertisers, can charge fees on viewers for watching the sta-
tion.27 Because of new encryption techniques, viewer pricing is becoming
increasingly important.28 We denote the viewer fee on platform i ∈ {0, 1}
by fi and restrict it to be nonnegative.
25See www.agf.de/daten/werbemarkt/werbespendings/.
26Another possible explanation, which is often given in newspapers, is the struggling
German economy. This can explain part of the price drop. But it is hardly conceivable
that prices have dropped in a growing market by such a large amount because of this
reason alone.
27For an early discussion about the advantages and problems of viewer pricing, see
Coase (1966).
28In the US, many special interest channels, especially sports or movie channels, can
only be watched by paying additional fees. Similarly, in many European countries, recent
movies or popular sport events can only be watched via pay TV.
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To simplify the analysis in what follows, we assume that ω′ = ω and
that a multi-homing viewer’s utility is simply the sum of the net benefits
obtained from watching each program:
u(x) = s0(β − γa0 − τx− f0) + s1(β − γa1 − τ(1− x)− f1),
for a viewer located at x. These utilities imply that n0 =M min(β−γa0−f0τ , 1)
and n1 =M min(β−γa1−f1τ , 1).
We focus on the case when the platforms are owned by competing firms.
The analysis of the case when platforms are operated by a monopolist is
analogous.29
In the above linear specification, a key determinant of whether stations
try to collect revenues through advertising fees or through viewer fees is the
relative magnitude of ω compared to γ. It is easy to show that if ω ≤ γ,
then independently of the other parameters, it is optimal for each station
to set a∗i = 0 and f
∗
i =
β
2 . If the nuisance parameter is too high relative
to the value of advertising, then there is no advertising in equilibrium, and
platforms collect all their revenues through viewer fees.
Assume from now on that ω > γ. For the region N ≥ βγ , the platforms
can act as local monopolists, and analysis remains the same as in Section 3:
stations set f∗i = 0 and a
∗
i =
β
2γ .
The most interesting case is when ω > γ, β ≥ τ, and N < βγ . For these
parameter values, there can be two types of equilibria. One is when both
stations only charge advertising fees. These equilibria are analogous to the
ones derived in Subsection 3.3. In particular, equilibrium advertising levels
can imply two-sided multi-homing, or overlapping viewerships and just not
overlapping advertisers, or overlapping advertisers and just not overlapping
viewerships. The second type of equilibrium is a new type of asymmetric
equilibrium. It involves one station collecting most or all of its revenue
through advertising, while the other station collects most of its revenue
through viewer fees. This asymmetry is interesting, because our model is
perfectly symmetric for the firms. This type of equilibrium can exist if the
travel cost cost parameter is low, advertisers are relatively scarce, and ω′′ is
low. The intuition for this is the following. ω > γ implies that it is more
29This analysis is available from the authors upon request.
25
efficient to collect revenues through advertising fees than through viewer
fees. However, for parameter values as above, if one station advertises a
lot, the other station might be better off switching to positive viewer fees
and only serving the remaining low fraction of advertisers, since otherwise
it would either have to establish two-sided overlap (which is undesirable
because of the low ω′′) or nonoverlapping viewerships (which is undesirable
because the station’s market share would be low).
Proposition 8: There exists a range of parameter values for which there
are asymmetric equilibria such that station i sets a∗i =
N
2 + δ (δ ∈ (0, N2 ))
and f∗j = max(0,
2β−(2δ+N)(ω+γ)
4 ) and gets most or all of its revenues from
advertising, while station −i sets a∗−i = N2 − δ and f∗−i = 2β+(2δ−N)(ω+γ)4
and gets most of its revenue via viewer fees.
This type of differentiation among stations can be observed in various
settings. For example, standard commercial TV channels in the US are
cheap to subscribe to and broadcast relatively many commercials, while ex-
clusive channels like HBO are more expensive to subscribe to but broadcast
less or no commercials.
We conclude this section by pointing out that the welfare implications
of introducing viewer fees are ambiguous, as in models with viewer single-
homing like Anderson and Coate (2005). For many parameters, viewer fees
improve welfare, because they help internalizing the negative externalities
on the viewer side. For example, consider the case in which ω < γ and
N ≥ βγ . In this case, the optimal policy in the duopoly and also in both
monopoly regimes is a∗i =
β
2γ , which leads to a welfare of
β2(2ω+γ)
4τγ . Instead,
with the viewer fee, a∗i = 0 and f
∗
i =
β
γ , giving a welfare of
3β2
4 γ , which is
higher than the one without viewer fee because ω < γ. Here the possibility
of a viewer fee lead both stations to reduce their advertising levels, which
improves welfare. However, there exist also constellations such that viewer
fees are welfare reducing. In all three regimes, there are cases in which the
optimal policy without the viewer fee is a∗i =
N
2 , while with the viewer fee,
a station leaves its advertising level unchanged but sets f∗i > 0, which is
welfare reducing. Here the stations use the viewer fee only to extract more
surplus from viewers.
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6 Extensions
Our analysis can be extended in many directions. Here we only briefly
discuss a few of them.
If advertisers are heterogeneous with respect to the surplus that their
product can generate, as in Anderson and Coate (2005), then there is an
extra incentive for firms to advertise less. This is the usual downward distor-
tion effect resulting from imperfect competition, in both the monopoly and
the duopoly cases (more profitable advertisers are willing to pay a higher
advertising fee per viewer). However, most of the qualitative conclusions of
our analysis still apply in this framework.
If viewers are heterogeneous with respect to the nuisance parameter for
advertising and platforms can charge viewer fees, then there can be equi-
libria that are qualitatively different from the ones characterized in Section
5. One possibility is that the same platform offers different versions of the
same content, with different levels of advertising. This phenomenon can be
observed among Internet-based services: there are websites that offer differ-
ent subscription fees to their members depending on whether they choose to
access the same service with on-screen advertisements or without them.30
An interesting extension of the model would be explicitly modeling sta-
tions’ decision on the timing of commercials.31 Sweeting (2005, 2006) points
out (and provides empirical evidence) that if channels can synchronize the
timing of their commercial blocks, then they have an incentive to do so
because it increases the value of overlapping viewers. The reason is that
synchronizing prevents listeners from switching channels when commercials
come on the air. Our model provides an additional reason for coordinating
commercial block times. It increases the value of multi-homing listeners even
if they do not flip channels to avoid commercials, by making it less likely
that a listener will hear a commercial broadcasted on two different channels
twice, bringing the value of ω′′ closer to ω′.
30See for example Fileplanet at http://www.fileplanet.com/subscribe/subscribe.shtml,
a web site that allows members to download PC games. Access with advertisements is
$6.95/month, while advertisement-free access is $9.95/month.
31This issue is of course only relevant for the case of electronic media.
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7 Conclusion
The main point of our paper is that in media markets, keeping a distinc-
tion between exclusive and overlapping viewership is important, because
the value of a single-homing viewer and of a multi-homing viewer might be
very different for a media platform. The possibility of overlapping viewer-
ship changes the nature of competition among stations, which needs to be
taken into account in both theoretical and empirical investigations of these
markets.
8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix A: Single-Homing Viewers
To provide a benchmark for comparison, in this appendix we characterize
equilibrium in the same model as the one defined in Section 2 (in particular,
assuming that advertisers are homogeneous), with the modification that
viewers cannot multi-home. We show that the welfare implications of the
resulting model are ambiguous, as in the more general setting of Anderson
and Coate (2005). A monopolist platform owner either advertises too much
in equilibrium or broadcasts the socially efficient level of advertising. The
level of advertising in duopoly competition can be either too high, socially
efficient, or too low. Finally, advertising is (weakly) higher in monopoly than
in duopoly, and it is ambiguous whether monopoly or duopoly leads to a
more efficient outcome. For the intuition behind these results, see Anderson
and Coate (2005).
Just like in Section 3, we assume that N ≥ max(2β−τ2γ , β2γ ), to rule out
cases when the total number of advertisers is a binding constraint on ad-
vertising levels in equilibrium. This is done to simplify the exposition; the
propositions below can be easily extended to parameter values not satisfying
the above restriction.
If τ ≥ β, then stations are local monopolists and do not compete for
the same viewers, independently if there is a monopolist platform owner or
competing platforms. If β < τ , then the following observations can be made:
(i) if there is a set of viewers who would have positive net utility from
watching both channels, then the marginal viewer is x = 12 +
γ(a1−a0)
2τ . Then
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the profit of station 0 is Π0 = (12 +
γ(a1−a0)
2τ )Mωa0, and the profit of station
1 is Π1 = (12 − γ(a1−a0)2τ )Mωa1.
(ii) if there are no viewers who would have positive net utility from watch-
ing both channels, then simple considerations establish that the marginal
viewer gets exactly 0 net utility when connecting to either channel; other-
wise the channels could increase their profits.
This leads to the following characterization of equilibria:
Monopoly:
The equilibrium level of advertising for a monopolist platform provider
if viewers cannot multi-home is given by:
amoni =
{
β
2γ if β ≤ τ
2β−τ
2γ if τ < β.
The β ≤ τ case is straightforward. If there is a set of viewers who would
have positive net utility from watching both channels, then the monopolist
could increase its profits by increasing advertising on both channels. Fur-
thermore, the monopolist’s profit is maximized if the marginal viewer is
x = 12 . These imply the result for τ < β.
Duopoly:
In this case, we only characterize symmetric equilibria. The asymmetric
equilibria that arise for a range of parameter values are similar to the ones
in the model in which viewers can multi-home.32 It is straightforward to
show that the asymmetric equilibria that can arise imply the same total
amount of advertising and smaller total welfare than the (unique) symmetric
equilibrium for the corresponding parameter values. This implies that the
propositions below hold for asymmetric equilibria as well.
The equilibrium level of advertising in symmetric equilibrium for com-
peting providers if viewers cannot multi-home is given by:
32Just like when viewers can multi-home, it can be shown that asymmetric equilibria
can only arise when in equilibrium the marginal viewer gets 0 net utility from connecting
to either channel. In this case, we focus on the case when the marginal viewer is x = 1
2
,
although there is an interval around 1
2
such that the marginal viewer can be any point of
this interval.
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aduoi =

β
2γ if β ≤ τ
2β−τ
2γ if β > τ ≥ 2/3β
τ
γ if τ < 2/3β.
The β ≤ τ case is straightforward. For β > τ , assume first that the
marginal viewer gets positive utility from joining a channel. Then Π0 =
(12 +
γ(a1−a0)
2τ )Mωa0 and Π1 = (
1
2 − γ(a1−a0)2τ )Mωa1 imply that the best
response functions of the platforms are ai =
τ+γa−i
2γa−i for i = 0, 1. This implies
that the marginal viewer is 12 and that a0 = a1 =
τ
γ . The condition for
viewers located at 12 getting positive utility when a0 = a1 =
τ
γ is τ < 2/3β.
For β > τ ≥ 2/3β, the marginal consumer at 12 gets exactly 0 net utility
when connecting to a channel, which yields aduo0 = a
duo
1 =
2β−τ
2γ .
Comparing amoni with a
duo
i , it is obvious that a
mon
i is always (weakly)
higher than aduoi .
Social optimum:
The socially optimal level of advertising if viewers cannot multi-home is
given by:
aWFi =

0 if γ ≥ ω
β(ω−γ)
γ(2ω−γ) if γ < ω and
2βω
2ω−γ ≤ τ
2β−τ
2γ if γ < ω and
2βω
2ω−γ > τ.
The case when γ ≥ ω and the case when γ < ω and 2βω2ω−γ ≤ τ are the
same as in the model in which viewers can multi-home. If 2βω(2ω−γ) > τ , then
it is easy to establish that in the welfare maximizing outcome, all consumers
connect to a channel. In this case, the welfare function is:
WF = (
1
2
+
γ(a1 − a0)
2τ
)Mωa0 + (
1
2
− γ(a1 − a0)
2τ
)Mωa1+
+M
∫ 1
2
+
γ(a1−a0)
2τ
0
(β − γa0 − τx)dx+M
∫ 1
1
2
+
γ(a1−a0)
2τ
(β − γa0 − τ(1− x))dx.
If γ < ω, then the above expression is increasing in ai (i = 0, 1). Fur-
thermore, WF (a0, a1) ≥ WF (a0−a12 , a0−a12 ). Then the welfare maximizing
advertising levels are the maximum possible symmetric levels that are com-
patible with all consumers wanting to connect to a channel, which is 2β−τ2γ .
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Using the above results, we can compare the socially optimal level of
advertising with the equilibrium levels of advertising in monopoly and in
duopoly.
First consider a monopolist provider. If ω > γ, then the socially efficient
amount is given by β(ω−γ)γ(2ω−γ) if
2βω
2ω−γ ≤ τ and by 2β−τ2γ if 2βω2ω−γ > τ . Instead, a
monopolist advertises β2γ if β ≤ τ and 2β−τ2γ if τ < β. Comparing this shows
that in the region 2βω2ω−γ ≤ τ , a monopolist advertises too much because
β
2γ >
β(ω−γ)
γ(2ω−γ) since γ > 0. In the region β ≤ τ < 2βω2ω−γ , the monopolist also
advertises too much because comparing amoni =
β
2γ with a
WF
i =
2β−τ
2γ shows
that amoni > a
WF
i because β ≤ τ in this region. Lastly, for β > τ , both
advertising amounts are the same. If ω ≤ γ, then the socially optimal level
of advertising is zero while the monopolist chooses a positive level.
This concludes that if ω ≤ γ, or if ω > γ and τ ≥ β, then the monopolist
advertises more on both platforms than the socially efficient amount. If
ω > γ and τ < β, then the monopolist in equilibrium chooses the socially
efficient level of advertising.
Now consider the duopoly case. Since the advertising amounts here are
the same as in monopoly for τ ≥ 2/3β, the result for this case is analogous
to the result for a monopolist platform provider. For τ < 2/3β, aduoi =
τ
γ ,
while the socially efficient amount is 2β−τ2γ . Comparing these two equations
shows that τγ <
2β−τ
2γ if τ < 2/3β, which holds in this region. If ω ≤ γ, then
the socially optimal level of advertising is zero, while market equilibrium
always implies positive advertising levels.
This concludes that if ω ≤ γ, or if ω > γ and τ ≥ β, then there is
too much advertising on both platforms in symmetric duopoly equilibrium
compared to the social optimum. If ω > γ and β > τ ≥ 2/3β, then the
level of advertising in symmetric duopoly equilibrium is socially efficient. If
ω > γ and τ < 2/3β, then the level of advertising is lower on both platforms
in symmetric duopoly equilibrium than in social optimum.
The previous results imply that competition among platforms leads to
a more efficient outcome than monopoly does if τ < 2/3β and γ ≥ ω, while
monopoly leads to a more efficient outcome than competition if τ < 2/3β
and γ < ω. In all other cases, monopoly and platform competition are
equally efficient from a social point of view.
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8.2 Appendix B: Proofs
Lemma 1: In the nondiscriminating monopoly and the duopoly cases mar-
ket clearing prices are uniquely determined for any a0, a1 ∈ (0, N) such that
a0 + a1 6= N , and they are given by:
pi =

ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 ≤ N
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 > N.
In the discriminating monopoly case market clearing prices on platforms
0 and 1 are uniquely determined for any a0, a1 > 0 such that a0 + a01 < N
and a1 + a01 < N and a0 + a1 6= N , and they are given by:
pi =
{
ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
ω(ni − n01) + ω′n01 if n0 + n1 > M
If moreover a01 ∈ (0, N) then the market clearing price of a joint adver-
tising slot is uniqely determined as well, and it is given by:
p01 = ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider first the nondiscriminating monopoly
and duopoly cases.
If n0+n1 ≤M then pi < ωni would imply that the demand for advertis-
ing spots on channel i is N , therefore these prices do not clear the market.
Similarly, pi > ωni would imply that the demand for advertising spots on
channel i is 0, therefore these prices do not clear the market. At pi = ωni
advertisers are indifferent between advertising on channel i or not.
If n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 < N then pi > (ni − n01)ω+ n01ω′ for some
i ∈ {0, 1} implies that the demand for advertising spots on channel i is 0,
therefore these prices do not clear the market. And pi < (ni−n01)ω+n01ω′
for some i ∈ {0, 1} implies that the sum of the demands for advertising spots
for the two channels is at least N , so prices like this cannot clear the market.
If n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 > N then pi > (ni − n01)ω + n01ω′′ for
some i ∈ {0, 1} implies that no advertiser buying an advertising spot on the
other channel would buy an advertising spot on channel i as well. Therefore
the sum of demands for advertising spots on the two channels is at most
N , which means that these prices cannot clear the market. And pi < (ni −
n01)ω + n01ω′′ for some i ∈ {0, 1} implies that the demand for advertising
spots on channel i is N , therefore these prices do not clear the market.
Consider next the discriminating monopoly case.
If either (i) n0+n1 ≤M , or (ii) n0+n1 > M , a0+a01 < N , a1+a01 < N
and a01 = 0, then establishing the claim is analogous to the nondiscrimi-
nating monopoly case. Assume now that n0 + n1 > M , a0 + a01 < N ,
a1 + a01 < N and a01 > 0. Then if either pi < ω(ni − n01) + ω′n01 or
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p01 < ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01 then the sum of demands for ad-
vertising slots on channel i and for the joint advertising slots is at least N ,
therefore these prices cannot clear the market. If pi > ω(ni − n01) + ω′n01
then demand for advertising slots on channel i is 0, therefore these prices
cannot clear the market. Finally, if p01 > ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01
then demand for the joint advertising slots is 0, therefore these prices cannot
clear the market. 
Lemma 2: In the nondiscriminating monopoly and the duopoly cases,
if in equilibrium ai = N for some i ∈ {0, 1}, or ai > 0 and a0 + a1 = N ,
then the equilibrium price for advertising slots on channel i is given by:
pi =

ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 ≤ N
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′′ if n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 > N.
In the discriminating monopoly case, if in equilibrium ai = N for some
i ∈ {0, 1}, or ai > 0 and either ai + a01 = N or a0 + a1 = N , then the
equilibrium price for advertising slots on channel i is given by:
pi =
{
ωni if n0 + n1 ≤M
(ni − n01)ω + n01ω′ if n0 + n1 > M
If also a01 > 0, then the equilibrium price for a joint advertising spot is
given by:
p01 = ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the nondiscriminating monopoly and
duopoly cases. If ai = N and n0 + n1 ≤ M then any price pi ≤ ωni clears
the market.
Suppose that in equilibrium ai = N and pi < ωni. Then the platform
owner, by changing advertising level on channel i to N − ε for small enough
ε > 0 can increase its profit, since for such advertising levels the market
clearing price is unique and given by pi = ωni. This concludes that the above
cannot be an equilibrium. Similar erguments establish that if in equilibrium
ai = N , n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 ≤ N then pi = (ni − n01)ω + n01ω′,
and that if in equilibrium ai = N , n0 + n1 > M and a0 + a1 > N then
pi = (ni − n01)ω + n01ω′′.
Suppose now that ai > 0, a0+a1 = N and n0+n1 ≤M . Then pi > ωni
implies that the demand for advertising spots on channel i is 0, therefore such
prices cannot clear the market. Note that pi = ωni is a market clearing price,
since all advertisers are indifferent between advertising or not on channel i
at that price. Assume that in equilibrium pi < ωni. Then channel i could
increase its profit by decreasing the advertising level by ε for small enough
ε > 0, since for such prices the market clearing price is unique, and given
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by pi = ωni. Similar erguments establish that if in equilibrium ai > 0,
a0 + a1 = N and n0 + n1 > M then pi = (ni − n01)ω + n01ω′.
The arguments that establish the claims for the discriminating monopoly
case are analogous to the above. 
The proofs of all subsequent propositions use the results in Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 on equilibrium prices.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let Π∗M =
MN(2τω−2βω+4βω′−2τω′+Nγω−2Nγω′)
2τ
and Π∗∗M =
M [ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(2ω′′−ω) .
We need to consider three cases: when there is no overlap of viewers
(either with or without advertiser overlap), when viewers overlap but adver-
tisers do not, and finally when both viewers and advertisers overlap.
First assume that n01 = 0, which means no viewers overlap. The profit
function of station i is then given by
Πi = piai = ωM(
β − γai
τ
)ai.
Solving this for a0 and a1 yields ai = β2γ . The condition for which the above
values are compatible with the starting assumption n01 = 0 is β ≤ τ . This
concludes region (a).
If β > τ , then the best advertising level choices that lead to nonoverlap-
ping viewerships are a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ (resulting in n0 = n1 = M/2). The
profit in the latter case is ωM(2β−τ)2γ .
¿From now on, assume β > τ . To analyze the monopolist’s decision in
this parameter region, we distinguish between the case when 2β−τγ ≤ N and
the case when 2β−τγ > N .
Consider first 2β−τγ ≤ N . In this case, it cannot be that in equilibrium
both advertisers and viewers overlap, since overlapping viewership implies
a0 + a1 ≤ N . Suppose first that n01 > 0. Then the profit function in this
region is given by:
ΠM =Ma0
(
ωmax(1−A1, 0) + ω′min(A0 +A1 − 1, 1)
)
+
+Ma1
(
ωmax(1−A0, 0) + ω′min(A0 +A1 − 1, 1)
)
,
with Ai = β−γaiτ .
Solving this for a0 and a1 yields:
a0 = a1 = max(
ω′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)
2γ(2ω′ − ω) ,
β − τ
γ
). (3)
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The monopolist’s profit is then ΠM = min
(
Mω′(ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ))2
γτ(2ω′−ω)2 ,
(β−τ)2Mω′
γ
)
.
The above levels of advertising are consistent with the starting assump-
tion n01 > 0 iff ω′ > ωβ2β−τ . If ω
′ ≤ ωβ2β−τ , then establishing an overlapping
viewership is not optimal for the monopolist because ω′ is too small and so
n01 = 0. The optimal choice is a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ . This is one case in which
region (b) occurs.
Consider next 2β−τγ > N . Assume first that n01 > 0, but a0 + a1 < N .
Then equilibrium advertising levels are given by (3). This is only consistent
with the starting assumption a0 + a1 < N if
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′−ω) < N . In the
latter case, (3) is a global optimum for the monopolist (note that n01 > 0
holds because 2β−τγ > N). In this case, only viewers multi-home, while
there are some potential advertisers who do not advertise on either of the
channels. This concludes region (c).
Now consider ω
′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′−ω) ≥ N . Then the optimal choice for the
monopolist under which n01 > 0 and a0 + a1 ≤ N is setting a0 = a1 = N2 .
This gives a profit of:
Π∗M =
MN(2τω − 2βω + 4βω′ − 2τω′ +Nγω − 2Nγω′)
2τ
.
Here again viewers multi-home, but the overall number of potential ad-
vertisers is low enough such that they all advertise, but none of them are
multi-homing.
If ω
′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′−ω) ≥ 2β−τ2γ , which holds when ω′ ≤ βω2β−τ , the optimal
decision for the monopolist is a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ (establishing as before view-
erships that just do not overlap).
If ω′ > βω2β−τ and N ≤ ω
′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′−ω) , then we have to consider three
scenarios: nonoverlapping viewership (i.e. a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ ), overlapping
viewership and nonoverlapping advertisers (i.e. a0 = a1 = N2 ), and overlap
on both sides. Consider the latter scenario first: n01 > 0 and a0 + a1 > N .
The profit function in this case is given by:
ΠM =Ma0
(
ω(1− β − γa1
τ
) + ω′′(
2β − γ(a0 + a1)
τ
− 1)
)
+
+Ma1
(
ω(1− β − γa0
τ
) + ω′′(
2β − γ(a0 + a1)
τ
− 1)
)
.
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Given the constraints x0 ≤ 1 and x1 ≥ 0, the optimal solution is:
a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)
2γ(2ω′′ − ω) .
This gives a profit of
Π∗∗M =
Mω′′[ω′′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)]2
γτ(2ω′′ − ω)2 .
This solution is only consistent with the assumptions n01 > 0 and a0 +
a1 > N if ω′′ > βω2β−τ and N ≤ ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′′−ω) . It can be shown that in
the relevant parameter range, ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′′−ω) >
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′−ω) ; therefore
N ≤ ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)γ(2ω′−ω) implies N ≤ ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′′−ω) . So the above advertising
levels indeed imply two-sided multi-homing. It still remains to check that
this is more profitable than reducing advertisers to a0 = a1 = N2 , which
holds iff Π∗∗M ≥ Π∗M . This is one case of region (d) and also region (e).
If ω′′ ≤ βω2β−τ , then the optimal choice for the monopolist is either
a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ or a0 = a1 =
N
2 , depending on the relative magnitudes of
ωM(2β−τ)
2γ and Π
∗
M . It can be shown that
ωM(2β−τ)
2γ ≥ Π∗M iff N ≤ ωτγ(2ω′−ω) .
This is a second case in which either region (b) or (d) occurs. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let Π+M be the profit if each station contains
ai =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
2(2ω′′−ω)γ advertising slots.
If advertisers overlap, then a01 = N−a0−a1. From this, the monopolist’s
profit function can be written as follows:
Πm = a0M
(
ω(1− β − γ(N − a0)
τ
) + ω′(
2β − γ(2N − a0 − a1)
τ
− 1)
)
+
a1M
(
ω(1− β − γ(N − a1)
τ
) + ω′(
2β − γ(2N − a0 − a1)
τ
− 1)
)
+
(N−a0−a1)M [ω(2−2β − γ(2N − a0 − a1)
τ
)+(ω′+ω′′)(
2β − γ(2N − a0 − a1)
τ
−1)].
The first term is the revenue from advertisers only advertising on plat-
form 0; the second term is the revenue from advertisers who only advertise
on platform 1; and the third term is the revenue from multi-homing adver-
tisers. Writing out the first-order conditions and solving for the optimal
values of a0 and a1 yields:
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a0 = a1 =
ω(β − τ)− ω′′(2β − τ)−Nγ(ω′ + 3ω′′ − 2ω)
2(2ω′′ − ω)γ . (4)
This implies that total advertising on a platform is:
ai = ai + a01 =
ω′′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)−Nγ(ω′ − ω′′)
2(2ω′′ − ω)γ .
Denote the resulting profit of the monopolist by Π+. The above levels of
advertising are only consistent with the assumptions n01 ≥ 0 and a0+a1 ≥ N
if ω′′ ≥ βω2β−τ andN ≤ ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
(2ω′′−ω)γ . It can be shown thatN ≤
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
(2ω′′−ω)γ is implied by N ≤ ω
′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(2ω′−ω) . Then
2β−τ
2γ ≥
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
2(2ω′′−ω)γ implies that the optimal choice for the monop-
olist is either N2 or the levels specified by (4), depending on the relative
magnitudes of Π∗M and Π
+. Similarly, 2β−τ2γ ≤ ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−Nγ(ω′−ω′′)
2(2ω′′−ω)γ
implies that the optimal advertising level on each platform is either 2β−τ2γ or
N
2 , depending on N bigger or smaller than
ωτ
γ(2ω′−ω) . 
Proof of Proposition 3: Let Πddi =
(2τ(ω−ω′′)+2β(2ω′′−ω)−γN(2ω′′−ω))2
16τω′′γ
and
Πdevj =
(
M(N − ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)γ(3ω′′−ω)
)(
ω
(
1− β−
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
(3ω′′−ω)
τ
)
+ ω′
(
2β−γN
τ − 1
))
.
Assume first that viewers overlap, but advertisers do not. The profit
function of firm i is then given by
Πi =Mai
(
max(ω(1− β − γaj
τ
), 0) + min(ω′(
2β − γ(ai + aj)
τ
− 1), ω′)
)
.
Taking the first order condition and solving for ai yields:33
ai = max[12
τ
γω′
(
ω
(− 1τ (β − γaj) + 1)+ ω′ ( 1τ (2β − γaj)− 1)) , β−τγ ],
which is increasing in aj (levels of advertising are strategic complements).
The equilibrium levels of advertising are:
a0 = a1 = max(
ω′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)
γ(3ω′ − ω) ,
β − τ
γ
). (5)
This yields equilibrium profits of
Πi = min(
Mω′[(2β − τ)ω′ − ω(β − τ)]2
γτ(3ω′ − ω)2 ,
Mω′(β − τ)
γ
).
33The second order condition for maximum, −2Mω′ γ
τ
< 0, is satisfied.
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The above equilibrium is only valid as long as at advertising levels given
by (5) viewers overlap, but advertisers do not. The condition for no viewer
overlap is ω′ ≥ τω2β−τ . If ω′ < τω2β−τ , then the only possibility for an equilib-
rium is when the two platforms set their advertising levels such that viewers
just do not overlap. This means that in equilibrium, aj + ai = 2β−τγ and
n0 + n1 = M .34 That is, the sum of advertising levels and the sum of
viewerships are uniquely pinned down. However, how the share of adver-
tising (and total viewership) is divided between channels is not uniquely
determined. For any parameter constellation satisfying ω′ < τω2β−τ , there
is a δ ∈ (0, 12) such that a0 = 2β−τγ + δ, a1 = (1 − x)2β−τγ − δ constitute
an equilibrium of the duopoly game for any δ ∈ [−δ, δ]. Among these, we
focus on the symmetric equilibrium a0+ a1 = 2β−τ2γ , which both is the most
efficient from the social point of view and maximizes the total profit of the
platforms. The qualitative conclusions of our model would not change if
instead we selected an asymmetric sharing rule of the market for the above
parameter values. This concludes one case of region (a).
The condition for advertisers not to overlap at advertising levels given by
(5) is N ≥ 2ω′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)γ(3ω′−ω) . Just like in the case of a monopolist provider,
this automatically holds if 2β−τγ ≤ N . This concludes region (b).
Assume from now on that ω′ > τω2β−τ and N <
2ω′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) . Then
there can be three types of equilibria: (i) a0 + a1 > N and n01 > 0 (two-
sided overlap); (ii) a0 + a1 > N and n0 + n1 = M (viewerships just do not
overlap); (iii) a0 + a1 = N and n01 > 0 (advertisers just do not overlap).
If a0 + a1 > N and n01 > 0, then profit functions are given by
Πi =Mai
(
ω(1− β − γaj
τ
) + ω′′(
2β − γ(ai + aj)
τ
− 1)
)
.
Solving for the equilibrium levels yields:
a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)
γ(3ω′′ − ω) . (6)
This gives a profit of Mω
′′[(2β−τ)ω′′−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(3ω′′−ω)2 .
Next we characterize the range of parameter values for which each of the
above symmetric profiles constitutes equilibrium.
34Note that the maintained assumption β
2γ
≤ N implies 2β−τ
2γ
≤ N ; therefore there are
a0, a1 ∈ [ 2β−τγ −N,N ] such that a0 + a1 = 2β−τγ .
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First we consider the region N > 2ω
′′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) .
35 Note that ω′′ <
τω
2β−τ implies the previous condition, since ω
′′ < τω2β−τ implies
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) <
2β−τ
2γ , and N >
2ω′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) implies
2β−τ
γ < N . Then advertising levels
in (6) imply a0+a1 < N . Therefore in this region, overlapping on both sides
cannot be in equilibrium.
Out of the remaining two possibilities, a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ constitutes an
equilibrium if no firm wants to decrease advertising to N − 2β−τ2γ , the point
at which advertisers do not overlap anymore. The profit implied by this
deviation isM(N− 2β−τ2γ )
(
ω(1− β−
2β−τ
2
τ ) + ω
′(2β−γNτ − 1)
)
. Therefore the
condition for a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ to constitute an equilibrium is
ω
2
2β − τ
2γ
≥ (N − 2β − τ
2γ
)
(
ω(1− β −
2β−τ
2
τ
) + ω′(
2β − γN
τ
− 1)
)
. (7)
This inequality holds whenever
2β−τ+τ ω
ω′
2γ ≤ N . By (1), this is always
true; therefore for parameter range ω′ ≥ τω2β−τ , N < 2ω
′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) , and
ω′′ ≤ τω2β−τ , advertising levels a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ always constitute an equilib-
rium. This concludes a second case of region (a).
Finally, a0 = a1 = N2 constitutes an equilibrium if no firm wants to
deviate and set ai = 4β−2τ−γN2γ such that viewers just do not overlap (but
advertisers do). Advertising levels a0 = a1 = N2 imply a profit of
Πi =
MN(2τ(ω − ω′) + 2β(2ω′ − ω)− γN(2ω′ − ω))
4τ
.
The above deviation gives a profit of Πdevi =
ωM(4β−2τ−γN)(2τ−2β+γN)
4τγ .
Comparing these two profit levels shows that Πdevi is lower iff ω
′ ≥ γN−2(β−τ)γN .
This concludes the first case of region (c).
Consider now N ≤ 2ω′′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)γ(3ω′′−ω) . As shown above, this implies
ω′′ ≥ τω2β−τ . In this case, advertising levels in (6) are consistent with two-
sided multi-homing. The condition for this to constitute an equilibrium is
that no firm wants to deviate. Set ai = N− ω
′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) to avoid overlap
35It can be shown that this cannot be the case if τ ≥ β
2
, because in the latter case,
2ω′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) > N implies
2ω′′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) > N.
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in advertisers. This deviation yields a profit of
Πdevj =
(
M(N − ω
′′(2β − τ)− ω(β − τ)
γ(3ω′′ − ω)
)
×
ω
1− β − ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)(3ω′′−ω)
τ
+ ω′(2β − γN
τ
− 1
) .
The deviation is therefore profitable if Πdevj >
Mω′′[(2β−τ)ω′′−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(3ω′′−ω)2 .
Thus, a0 = a1 =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) constitutes an equilibrium ifN ≤ 2ω
′′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω)
and Πdevj >
Mω′′[(2β−τ)ω′′−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(3ω′′−ω)2 .
It is straightforward to show that a0 = a1 = 2β−τ2γ cannot be in equilib-
rium if N ≤ 2ω′′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)γ(3ω′′−ω) . This concludes region (d).
Finally, the condition for a0 = a1 = N2 to constitute an equilibrium is
that no firm has an incentive to deviate to increase advertising (resulting in
two-sided overlap). It can be shown that the optimal deviation of this type
is addi =
2τ(ω−ω′′)+2β(2ω′′−ω)−γN(2ω′′−ω)
4ω′′γ , giving a profit of
Πddi =
(2τ(ω − ω′′) + 2β(2ω′′ − ω)− γN(2ω′′ − ω))2
16τω′′γ
.
Therefore the condition for the existence of this type of equilibrium is
Πddi ≤
MN(2τ(ω − ω′) + 2β(2ω′ − ω)− γN(2ω′ − ω))
4τ
.
This concludes the second case of region (c). 
Proof of Proposition 4: First note that a welfare maximizing vector
of advertising levels a0, a1, a01 cannot imply ni = 0 for some i ∈ {0, 1};
otherwise, setting a′0, a′1, a′01 such that a′−i = a−i + a01 and ai = a01 = 0
would lead to strict welfare improvement: it would generate positive as
opposed to zero social welfare on platform i while leaving social welfare
generated on the other platform unchanged. As shown in Subsection 3.1,
n0 = max(0,min(β−γa0τ , 1)M) and n1 = max(0,min(
β−γa1
τ , 1)M). This can
be used to show that if a0 6= a1 and if advertising levels a0, a1, a01 imply
ni > 0 for i ∈ {0, 1}, then setting a′0, a′1, a′01 such that a′0 = a′1 = a0+a12
and a′01 = a01 leads to strict welfare improvement. This complements the
result in Subsection 3.2 that if b0, b1, b01 are equilibrium advertising levels
for a discriminating monopolist, then b0 = b1. Note that if a0, a1, a01 is
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either a welfare maximizing or a discriminating monopoly equilibrium ad-
vertising vector, then the following statements hold: (i) if a0, a1, a01 implies
n01 > 0, then a01 = max(0, a0 + a1 − N); otherwise, social welfare or the
monopolist profit could be increased by increasing a0, a1 and decreasing a01;
(ii) if a0, a1, a01 implies n01 > 0, then any a′0, a′1, a′01 such that a′i = ai
for i ∈ {0, 1} would imply the same level of social welfare and monopolist
profit. The above establish that if a0, a1, a01 is either a welfare maximizing
or a discriminating monopoly equilibrium advertising vector, then it can be
described simply by the scalar a0 = a1.
Let now a0 = a1 = a∗ in an equilibrium with a discriminating monopo-
list. This implies that the profit function
Π(a) = 2(a−max(0, 2a−N)) (ω(n0 − n01) + ω′n01)+
max(0, 2a−N)[ω(n0 + n1 − 2n01) + (ω′ + ω′′)n01]
is such that Π(a∗) ≥ Π(a) for any a ≥ a∗. But note that the welfare
function is
WF (a) = Π(a)+
M
(n0−n01)/M∫
0
(β − γa− τx)dx+M
1∫
1−(n1−n01)/M
(β − γa− τ(1− x))dx)+
n0/M∫
(n0−n01)/M
u(β − γa− τx, β − γa− τ(1− x))dx,
where the last three terms are strictly decreasing in a. ThereforeWF (a∗) >
WF (a) for any a > a∗, implying that any welfare maximizing advertising
vector has to be such that ai < a∗. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Applying the results of Proposition 1-3 in
the specification of the current proposition implies that if equilibrium im-
plies two-sided overlapping, then adis =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−γN(ω−ω′′)
2γ(2ω′′−ω) , and =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′′−ω) , and aduo =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) . The relationship aduo < and is
immediate from and =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′′−ω) and aduo =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′′−ω) . Com-
paring aduo with adis =
ω′′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)−γN(ω−ω′′)
2γ(2ω′′−ω) reveals that aduo > adis
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if ω′′(2β − τ) − ω(β − τ) < γN(3ω′′ − ω). From assumption (1), the right
hand side is at least 2β−τ2 (3ω
′′ − ω); therefore it is always higher than the
left-hand side if ω′′ ≥ ωτ2β−τ . But this inequality always holds in case of two-
sided multi-homing, and so aduo > adis. Finally, aWF < adis by Proposition
4. 
Proof of Proposition 6: N ≥ 2β−τγ implies that there cannot be
overlapping on both sides in equilibrium. Entry of a competitor implies the
following for channel 0:
(i) If β < τ , then there is no change in the level of advertising.
(ii) If β ≥ τ and ω′ < τω2β−τ , then advertising increases from β2γ to 2β−τ2γ .
(iii) If β ≥ τ and ω′ ≥ τω2β−τ , then advertising increases from β2γ to
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
2γ(2ω′−ω) =
β
2γ +
(ω−ω′)τ
2γ(2ω′−ω) . 
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider a neighborhood of parameter val-
ues such that β > τ , ω′ > τω2β−τ , and
2ω′(2β−τ)−2ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) < N . For these
parameter values, the unique equilibrium in duopoly competition implies
a0 = a1 =
ω′(2β−τ)−ω(β−τ)
γ(3ω′−ω) . The equilibrium profit of a station is given by
Mω′[(2β−τ)ω′−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(3ω′−ω)2 . Differentiating this
Mω′[(2β−τ)ω′−ω(β−τ)]2
γτ(3ω′−ω)2 with respect
to τ yields
Mω′
γ(3ω′ − ω)2 [(2(2β−τ)ω
′−2ω(β−τ))(ω−ω′)τ−[(2β−τ)ω′−ω(β−τ)]2]. (8)
After simplifying, the sign of this expression is given by:
sign
(
∂Πi
∂τ
)
= sign
(
(τ2 − 4β2)(ω′)2 + (4β2ω − 2τ2ω)ω′ + ω2τ2 − ω2β2) .
This sign is positive if
(ω(4β2−2τ2−2βτ)
8β2−2τ2
) ≤ ω′ ≤ (ω(4β2−2τ2+2βτ)
8β2−2τ2
)
. Since
in this region, ω′ > ωτ2β−τ and β > τ, there exists such ω
′. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Consider advertising levels a∗i =
N
2 + δ and
a∗−i =
N
2 − δ for some δ ∈ (0, N2 ). For these advertising levels, station −i’s
profit is Π−i = M(N/2 − δ + f−i)(β−γ(
N
2
−δ)−f−i
τ ). Maximizing this with
respect to f−i gives
f∗−i =
2β + (2δ −N)(ω + γ)
4
.
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f∗−i is here always positive, because N <
β
γ and ω > γ. This gives station
−i a profit of Π∗−i = M(2β+(N−2δ)(ω−γ))
2
16τ .
Calculating the optimal fee of station i yields f∗i =
2β−(2δ+N)(ω+γ)
4 . But
this fee is only positive as long as δ < 2β−N(ω+γ)2(ω+γ) , and station i then gets a
profit of Π∗i =
M(2β+(N+2δ)(ω−γ))2
16τ . Thus if δ ≥ 2β−N(ω+γ)2(ω+γ) , then f∗i = 0 and
station i only gets revenue from advertising.
To check if this profile is indeed an equilibrium, we need to check that
neither of the firms has a profitable deviation. The above implies that any
profitable deviation by i involves choosing a level of advertising different
from a∗i , and any profitable deviation by −i involves choosing a level of
advertising different from a∗−i. It can be shown that i (which obtains a
higher profit in this equilibrium) has a profitable deviation only if −i also
has one. Therefore, below we only consider deviations by −i.
Consider first the deviation such that −i advertises less than a∗−i. It can
be shown that this deviation is not profitable if M(2β+(N−2δ)(ω−γ))
2
16τ ≥ Mβ
2
4τ ,
or N ≥ 2δ. But the last inequality always holds since the maximal possible
value of δ is N2 .
If −i chooses an advertising level higher than a∗−i, then either viewerships
do not overlap, or there is two-sided overlap. Establishing two-sided overlap
is not profitable if ω′′ is low enough. To establish nonoverlapping viewer-
ships, −i has to set an advertising level that is at least adev−i = 4β−2γ−γN−2δ2γ .
This deviation is not profitable, though, for example if τ ≤ β2 and ω′′ ≥ ωτ2β−τ .
Note that the latter can hold for arbitrarily small positive ω′′ if β is large
enough. 
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